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Abstract	
This	study	analyzes	the	external	validity	of	experimentally	elicited	ambiguity	aversion,	likelihood	
insensitivity	and	risk	aversion	on	real-life	decision-making	in	the	field	of	student	loans.	Our	main	
finding	is	that	ambiguity	aversion,	likelihood	insensitivity	and	risk	aversion	are	not	related	to	the	
decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan	nor	to	the	amount	students	decide	to	borrow,	conditional	on	
having	a	loan.	We	discuss	our	results	in	the	context	of	recent	advances	to	relate	lab	measures	of	
ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	to	real	economic	decisions.	
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1.	Introduction	
	 Since	the	publication	of	the	well-known	Ellsberg	paradox	(1961),	ambiguity	aversion	has	
been	 found	and	 replicated	 in	many	 laboratory	 studies	 (Trautmann	and	 van	de	Kuilen,	 2015).	
Ambiguity	aversion	is	a	preference	for	risky	over	ambiguous	prospects	that	are	equivalent	under	
subjective	 expected	 utility.	 Several	 theoretical	 models	 have	 been	 developed	 that	 include	
parameters	 for	 ambiguity	 aversion	 to	 explain	 real-life	 individual	 and	 market	 behavior	 and	
anomalies	in	areas	such	as	portfolio	choices	(Dow	and	Werlang,	1992;	Easley	and	O’Hare,	2009),	
market	microstructure	(Easley	and	O’Hare,	2010;	Ozsoylev	and	Werner,	2009),	home	country	bias	
(Uppal	and	Wang,	2003)	and	break-down	of	trading,	which	occurred	during	the	recent	financial	
crisis	(Guidolin	and	Rinaldo,	2013).	Although	these	theoretical	models	seem	promising,	the	reality	
is	 that	 few	experimental	 studies	have	 found	a	clear	 relationship	between	 individually	elicited	
ambiguity	aversion	in	the	lab	and	real-life	behavior	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2015).	To	a	
certain	extent	the	same	limitation	also	applies	to	risk	preferences,	where	many	studies	provide	
mixed	evidence	 for	a	direct	 link	between	 individuals’	 lab-elicited	 risk	preferences	and	 related	
decision-making	in	real	life	(Friedman	et	al.,	2014;	Trautmann,	2016).	
	 Research	 on	 the	 predictive	 power	 of	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	 aversion	 is	
restricted	to	only	a	handful	of	studies.	In	the	field	of	developmental	economics,	Warnick,	Escobal	
and	Laszlo	(2011)	find	negative	effects	of	ambiguity	aversion	on	the	adoption	of	new	varieties	of	
crop	 in	 Peruvian	 farmers	 and	 Ross,	 Santos	 and	 Capon	 (2012)	 report	 a	 negative	 relationship	
between	ambiguity	aversion	and	the	adoption	of	new	variety	of	rice.	For	ambiguity	aversion,	as	
well	 as	 risk	 aversion,	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 find	 only	 a	weak	 correlation	with	 real-life	 decision-
making	in	adolescents.	Dimmock	et	al.	(2016a)	report	a	positive	correlation	between	ambiguity	
aversion	and	stock	market	participation	in	the	US,	but	in	a	very	similar	study	in	the	Netherlands	
this	 relationship	 only	 holds	 for	 subjects	 who	 perceive	 stock	 returns	 as	 highly	 ambiguous	
(Dimmock,	Kouwenberg	and	Wakker,	2016b).	
We	also	investigate	the	external	validity	of	likelihood	insensitivity,	which	is	a	modelling	
framework	 often	 discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011).	
Likelihood	 insensitivity	 describes	 people’s	 tendency	 to	 weight	 probabilities	 non-linearly.	
Specifically,	people	tend	to	overweight	low	likelihood	events,	also	referred	to	as	the	‘possibility	
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effect’,	and	underweight	high	likelihood	events,	which	is	known	as	the	‘certainty	effect’	(Wakker,	
2010).	This	tendency	affects	ambiguity	preferences	in	opposite	directions:	people	are	generally	
more	ambiguity	seeking	in	the	context	of	low	likelihood	events	and	more	ambiguity	averse	in	the	
context	 of	 high	 likelihood	 events.	 Regarding	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 likelihood	 insensitivity,	 a	
similar	 picture	 as	 with	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 risk	 aversion	 emerges:	 evidence	 for	 a	 clear	
relationship	 between	 lab	 measurements	 and	 real-life	 behavior	 is	 hard	 to	 find	 (Dimmock,	
Kouwenberg	and	Wakker,	2016b).	To	 the	best	of	our	knowledge,	Dimmock,	Kouwenberg	and	
Wakker	(2016b)	is	the	only	study	that	relates	likelihood	insensitivity	to	real	economic	decisions.	
They	report	a	negative	relation	between	likelihood	insensitivity	and	stock	market	participation,	
but,	 interestingly,	 not	 for	 ambiguous	 situations	 like	 self-employment	 or	 private	 business	
ownership.	
Overall,	 the	 link	 between	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	 aversion,	 likelihood	
insensitivity	 and	 decision-making	 in	 real	 life	 is	 mixed	 and	 findings	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 replicate	
reliably,	which	 is	 a	 serious	 issue	 for	policy	 recommendations.	 The	emerging	 literature	on	 the	
external	validity	of	the	aforementioned	experimental	measures	shows	that	there	is	a	need	for	
more	research	in	this	area	(also	see	Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2015).	We	contribute	to	this	
literature	by	investigating	the	relationship	between	ambiguity	aversion,	risk	aversion,	likelihood	
insensitivity	 and	 student	 borrowing	 behavior	 of	 233	 students	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 Student	
borrowing	is	an	important	policy	instrument	for	the	Dutch	government	(see	next	section)	and	
elsewhere.	Although	a	substantial	share	of	students	(35%)	in	the	Netherlands	take	out	student	
loans	(Kreetz,	van	der	Schors	and	van	der	Burg,	2012),	the	majority	prefers	to	finance	their	studies	
with	a	part-time	 job.	As	part-time	 jobs	affect	 the	total	amount	of	 time	spent	on	studying	the	
average	 study	 duration	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	 nearly	 six	 years,	 while	 most	 curriculums	 are	
designed	 for	 four	 yours	 only	 (Oosterbeek	 and	 van	 den	 Broek,	 2009).	 This	 situation	 can	 be	
mitigated	with	student	loans	and	is	not	unique	to	the	Netherlands.	Countries	like	the	UK,	the	US	
and	Australia	face	similar	problems.	In	fact,	in	many	of	these	countries	students	face	much	higher	
education	and	admission	fees	compared	to	the	Netherlands,	which	aggravates	the	problem	for	
students	who	want	to	avoid	loans	(Institute	for	Higher	Education	Policy,	2008).	
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A	 number	 of	 studies	 focus	 on	 debt	 aversion	 amongst	 students.	 Fear	 of	 debt	 and	 the	
prospect	of	accumulating	debt	can	even	influence	the	decision	to	study	in	the	first	place.	This	is	
especially	prevalent	among	low	socio-economic	groups	(Callender	and	Jackson,	2005;	2008).	The	
majority	of	studies	measure	debt	aversion	and	determinants	for	debt	aversion	with	survey	items	
like	 ‘owing	 money	 is	 basically	 wrong’,	 ‘there	 is	 no	 excuse	 for	 borrowing	 money’,	 or	 proxy	
questions	like	‘do	you	usually	pay	off	your	credit	card	balances	each	month	(conditional	on	having	
any)?’.	It	is	not	clear	whether	these	survey	questions	refer	to	risk	aversion,	ambiguity	aversion,	
or	other	related	components.	The	study	of	Eckel	et	al.	(2007)	is	a	notable	exception.	The	authors	
experimentally	elicit	debt	aversion	as	well	as	risk	and	time	preferences	with	Canadian	adults.	The	
authors	 find	 “no	 evidence	 that	 debt	 aversion	 is	 an	 important	 barrier	 to	 investment	 in	
postsecondary	education”	(p.234).	They	do	find,	however,	that	risk-seeking	and	patient	persons	
are	more	likely	to	take	up	education	financing,	supporting	the	notion	that	investing	in	education	
is	a	relatively	risky	choice.	In	this	study	we	therefore	also	elicit	risk	preferences	and	analyze	the	
relationship	between	risk	aversion	measured	in	the	lab	and	student	borrowing	behavior.	
	 Although	we	also	measure	risk	aversion	to	complement	previous	research,	our	primary	
argument	 in	 this	 study	 is	 that	 taking	 out	 student	 loans	 is	 less	 about	 risk	 and	 more	 about	
ambiguity,	 where	 probabilities	 for	 possible	 states	 are	 not	 known.	 We	 argue	 that	 students’	
aversion	to	borrow	may	be	primarily	driven	by	their	aversion	to	the	ambiguous	conditions	of	a	
student	loan.	As	explained	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section,	Dutch	students	face	a	multitude	of	
ambiguous	elements	in	the	decision	to	take	out	a	loan.	For	example,	the	total	debt	outstanding	
cannot	 be	 precisely	 assessed	 because	 student	 loan	 interest	 rates	 are	 floating	 and	 unknown.	
Students	are	therefore	uncertain	if	and	to	which	extent	receiving	the	loan	will	outweigh	the	ease	
and	cost	of	repayment	and	benefit	their	study	and	study	duration.	This	might	explain	why	the	
majority	of	Dutch	students	prefer	to	have	a	part-time	job	to	finance	their	studies.	Graduation	
and	a	decent	job	most	likely	ensure	that	students	will	have	no	serious	problem	to	repay	their	
debts,	but	both	 these	events	–	graduation	and	obtaining	a	 job	with	a	sufficient	 income	–	are	
several	years	and	numerous	ambiguous	events	away.	Yet	students	have	to	decide	at	the	start	of	
their	study	program	whether	to	take	out	a	student	loan	and,	importantly,	how	much.	The	higher	
the	 stakes,	 the	more	 confident	 a	 student	 needs	 to	 be	 that	 the	 student	 loan	 is	 a	worthwhile	
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investment	to	finance	their	study	and	generate	the	expected	income	and	career	as	a	result	(Hill,	
2013).	Accordingly,	we	expect	that	students	who	are	more	ambiguity	averse	will	borrow	less	than	
other	students.		
	 In	addition	to	the	effect	of	ambiguity	aversion	we	argue	that	likelihood	insensitivity	can	
affect	borrowing	behavior	when	students	perceive	the	probability	to	benefit	from	taking	out	a	
loan	(including	ease	of	loan	repayment)	as	a	high	likelihood	event.	Note	that	students	can	freely	
decide	on	the	loan	amount	and	borrow	very	small	and	easily	repayable	amounts,	for	example,	as	
additional	‘pocket	money’	when	they	decided	to	primarily	finance	their	studies	through	part-time	
jobs.	Hence,	we	assume	that	students	consider	it	to	be	likely	that	a	loan	will	benefit	their	study	
and	that	this	benefit	will	outweigh	the	burden	of	repayment.	We	therefore	expect	that	students	
with	likelihood	insensitivity	will	underweight	the	high	probability	that	the	loan	will	benefit	them	
and	hence	overweight	the	costs	associated	with	this	type	of	student	financing.	Hence,	we	predict	
that	students	who	exhibit	high	likelihood	insensitivity	will	try	to	either	refrain	from	borrowing	
completely,	or	borrow	as	little	as	possible.	
We	 use	 recent	 methods	 to	 elicit	 ambiguity	 aversion,	 risk	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	
insensitivity	 in	 a	 well-controlled	 laboratory	 setting	 and	 relate	 it	 to	 a	 real	 financial	 decision,	
student	 borrowing,	 which	 has	 ambiguous	 features	 and	 is	 relevant	 for	 all	 participants	 in	 our	
experimental	 population.	 We	 elicit	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	 insensitivity	 based	 on	
matching	probabilities	of	three	uncertain	events	with	the	following	likelihoods:	0.1,	0.5	and	0.9	
(Abdellaoui	et	al.,	 2011;	Dimmock,	Kouwenberg	and	Wakker,	2016b;	Dimmock	et	al.,	 2016a).	
After	 this	 elicitation	 procedure,	 students	 answer	 a	 variety	 of	 questions	 concerning	 their	
borrowing	behavior.	We	find	both	ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	in	our	sample.	
33%	 of	 our	 participants	 have	 a	 student	 loan,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 representative	 samples	
(Biermans	and	Budil-Nadvorníková,	2003;	van	den	Broek	and	van	de	Wiel,	2005;	Oosterbeek	and	
van	den	Broek,	2009).	Our	main	finding	is	that	ambiguity	aversion,	likelihood	insensitivity	and	risk	
aversion	are	not	related	to	the	decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan	nor	to	the	amount	they	decide	
to	borrow	conditional	on	borrowing.	In	the	last	section	of	this	paper	we	discuss	the	implications	
of	these	findings.	
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2.	Student	loans	in	the	Netherlands	
	 In	the	Netherlands,	students	can	get	two	kinds	of	financial	support	from	the	government:	
a	basic	scholarship	and	a	student	loan.	Most	students	receive	a	basic	government	scholarship.	
The	exact	amount	depends	on	the	individual’s	and	family’s	wealth	and	income	level.	Students	
receive	the	basic	scholarship	for	up	to	four	years,	because	the	majority	of	curriculums	are	set	up	
as	four-year	programs	(three	years	bachelor;	one	year	master).	Next	to	this	scholarship,	almost	
all	students	are	able	to	take	out	student	loans	that	are	subsidized	and	issued	by	the	government.	
Students	 can	 borrow	 up	 to	 €301.27	 per	 month.	 After	 four	 years	 of	 study,	 when	 the	 basic	
scholarship	ends,	students	can	borrow	up	to	€916.96	per	month	for	three	more	years.2	As	the	
student	 loans	by	 the	government	have	more	 favorable	 terms	 than	 individual	bank	 loans,	 the	
latter	are	rarely	used	by	Dutch	students	for	secondary	education	(Kreetz,	van	der	Schors	and	van	
der	Burg,	2012).	
	 Practically	every	student	is	eligible	for	the	full	loan	amount	and	application	is	very	easy.	
All	that	a	student	needs	to	do	is	visit	the	webpage	of	DUO	(the	relevant	governmental	agency	of	
the	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	 Education)	 and	 enter	 the	 required	 information.	 The	 website	 is	 very	
transparent	and	accessible	and	no	additional	mailings	or	requirements	are	needed.	A	student	
who	decides	to	take	out	a	student	loan	will	receive	the	first	loan	payment	within	a	month.	
	 If	a	student	graduates	within	ten	years,	the	basic	scholarship	will	be	awarded	as	a	gift.	The	
student	loan	has	to	be	repaid.	The	interest	rate	on	government	student	loans	are	based	on	the	
current	government	 interest	rate	and	are	therefore	much	lower	than	the	interest	rate	a	bank	
would	issue	on	loans.	While	studying,	students	already	incur	interest	costs	based	on	the	current	
interest	rate.	Two	years	after	a	student	graduates,	the	repayment	period	starts	and	the	graduate	
has	 to	 repay	 a	 fixed	 monthly	 amount.	 During	 the	 repayment	 period,	 interest	 costs	 on	 the	
remaining	loan	are	still	 incurred.	The	graduate	will	be	informed	about	this	interest	rate	at	the	
start	of	the	repayment	period.	Every	five	years	this	interest	rate	is	adjusted	for	a	new	period	of	
five	years.	The	repayment	period	has	a	maximum	of	15	years,	but	graduates	can	choose	to	repay	
faster.	
																																								 																				
2	This	was	the	current	situation	when	we	conducted	our	experiment	and	the	scheme	that	applied	to	our	experimental	
population.	In	the	discussion	we	explain	that	from	2015	onwards	the	financial	support	solely	relies	on	student	loans.	
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	 A	student	who	decides	to	take	out	a	student	loan	has	information	on	the	current	interest	
rate,	but	she	is	uncertain	about	the	different	interest	rates	that	will	apply	in	the	following	years	
of	study	and	during	the	various	repayment	periods.	On	its	web	page,	DUO	and	the	Ministry	of	
Education	offer	calculation	modules	to	estimate	future	loan	repayments.	The	estimated	monthly	
repayment	amounts	are	provided	for	four	different	possible	interest	rates	that	could	apply	in	the	
future.	There	is	no	information	provided	about	the	consequences	when	a	student	is	unable	to	
repay	her	loans.	
	 A	student,	who	decides	to	borrow	now,	can	do	so	with	a	few	mouse	clicks.	Yet	she	does	
not	know	the	exact	amount	that	she	needs	to	repay	in	the	future.	She	does	not	know	the	exact	
interest	rate	that	will	apply.	She	does	not	know	what	actions	can	be	taken	if	she	will	be	unable	
to	 repay	 in	 the	 future.	Overall,	 there	 is	 substantial	 ambiguity	about	 the	 consequences	of	 the	
decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan	at	this	moment	in	time.	
	
3.	Experimental	design	
	
3.1	Measuring	ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	
We	use	a	simple	and	tractable	method	known	as	probability	matching.	The	idea	is	to	elicit	
probability	equivalents	of	a	specific	uncertain	prospect	by	allowing	participants	to	simultaneously	
choose	between	an	event	with	unknown	probabilities	and	an	event	with	known	probabilities.	
Using	a	multiple	choice	list	format,	a	subjective	probability	'mp'	is	elicited	from	the	participants	
for	which	they	are	indifferent	between	the	unknown	event	E	and	a	gamble	where	outcome	1	is	
realized	with	probability	mp. For	instance,	tomorrow	it	might	rain	(outcome	1)	or	not	(outcome	
0).	This	unknown	event	E	can	be	described	as	1E0.	If	there	exists	a	number	mp	such	that	1E0	~	
1mp0,	we	call	mp	the	matching	probability	of	E	(Wakker,	2010,	p.	120).	The	difference	between	
the	underlying	likelihood	of	an	unknown	event	and	the	matching	probability	can	be	taken	as	an	
index	of	ambiguity	aversion	(Jaffray,	1989;	Kahn	and	Sarin,	1988;	Wakker,	2010).3	In	this	study,	
																																								 																				
3	 One	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 matching	 probabilities	 is	 that	 ambiguity	 aversion	 is	 directly	 measured	 relative	 to	 risk	
preferences	and	does	not	require	the	additional	elicitation	of	utility	or	probability	weighting	(Wakker,	2010).	
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we	estimated	individual’s	ambiguity	aversion	based	on	matched	probabilities	of	three	uncertain	
events	with	underlying	likelihoods:	0.1,	0.5	and	0.9.	
The	unknown	and	the	risky	events	in	our	experiment	are	operationalized	via	the	standard	
Ellsberg	urn	setup	(1961).	The	unknown	urn	was	composed	of	100	colored	chips	in	an	unknown	
composition.	If	the	underlying	likelihood	of	the	unknown	urn	was	0.5	(henceforth	U2),	all	chips	
in	U2	were	of	one	of	two	colors:	yellow	or	green.	The	colors	but	not	the	composition	were	known	
to	the	subjects.	The	risky	(known)	urn	(K2),	had	a	known	composition	of	yellow	and	green	chips.		
With	a	multiple	choice	list	procedure,	we	asked	participants	to	indicate	their	preference	
for	a	draw	from	either	urn	U2	or	K2.	See	Figure	A1	in	Appendix	A	for	a	visualization	of	this	setup.	
At	the	start	of	the	experiment,	before	instructions	had	been	distributed,	subjects	selected	one	
color:	 either	 yellow	 or	 green.	 The	 number	 of	 X	 chips	 in	 urn	 K2,	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
participant’s	selected	color,	increased	in	each	row	(option	B),	whereas	the	composition	of	urn	U2	
remained	unknown	and	fixed	(option	A).	Each	row	i	∈	(1,	2,	…	,	20)	in	this	list	was	a	separate	
binary	choice	between	urn	U2	and	K2.	In	other	words,	in	each	row	participants	had	to	choose	
from	which	urn	they	would	like	to	draw	a	chip:	from	urn	U2	(option	A)	or	from	urn	K2	(option	B).	
If	the	chip	from	the	preferred	urn	was	of	their	selected	color,	participants	won	€	15,	else	nothing	
(if	this	choice	was	randomly	selected	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	to	be	played	out	for	real).		
The	switching	point	from	option	A	to	option	B	indicates	when	a	subject	prefers	a	draw	
from	urn	K2	with	X	chips	in	their	selected	color	over	a	draw	from	urn	U2.	If	a	subject	switched	to	
Option	B	 in	 row	 i,	we	 take	 the	midpoint	between	Xi-1	and	Xi	 chips	as	an	estimate	of	 subjects’	
matching	probability	of	urn	U2.	The	earlier	a	participant	switches	from	option	A	to	option	B	the	
more	ambiguity	averse	she	is.		
We	refer	to	an	individual’s	matched	probability	in	the	two-color	urn	setup	as	m(0.5).	For	
instance,	if	m(0.5)	is	0.38,	then	a	subject	indicated	to	be	indifferent	between	a	draw	from	urn	U2	
and	a	draw	from	urn	K2	which	is	composed	of	38	chips	in	the	participant’s	selected	color	and	62	
chips	of	the	other	color.	If	m(0.5)	has	a	value	below	0.5,	which	is	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	
of	urn	U2,	ambiguity	aversion	is	expressed.	A	value	of	m(0.5)	higher	than	0.5	indicates	ambiguity	
loving	behavior.			
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We	 also	 elicited	 the	 matched	 probabilities	 m(0.1)	 and	 m(0.9),	 corresponding	 to	 the	
underlying	likelihoods	of	0.1	and	0.9,	by	using	a	10-color	urn	(see	Figures	A2	and	A3	in	Appendix	
A	for	these	setups).	To	elicit	m(0.1),	the	unknown	urn	(U10),	contained	100	chips	in	an	unknown	
composition	of	10	colors.	Urn	K10	on	the	other	hand	consisted	of	a	known	composition	of	100	
chips	with	10	colors.	With	the	same	multiple	choice	list	procedure	as	before,	we	measured	m(0.1)	
by	letting	the	participant	choose	between	a	draw	from	urn	U10	(option	A)	or	urn	K10	(option	B).	
Again,	participants	knew	that	they	could	win	€	15	if	the	chip	they	draw	from	their	preferred	urn	
was	of	their	selected	color,	else	they	won	nothing.	In	each	row	i	∈	(1,	2,…,20)	the	amount	(X)	of	
chips	in	the	participant’s	selected	color	in	urn	K10	increased.	The	minimum	amount	of	chips	in	
row	1	(X1)	was	2	chips,	and	the	maximum	amount	of	chips	(X20)	was	40	chips.	The	switching	point	
from	option	A	to	option	B	in	row	i	indicated	when	subjects	preferred	a	draw	from	urn	K10	with	
Xi	chips	in	their	selected	color	over	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	We	again	take	the	midpoint	of	tokens	
before	and	at	 the	switching	point,	Xi-1	+	
!"(Xi	-	Xi-1),	as	 the	value	of	m(0.1).	For	example,	when	
m(0.1)	is	0.16,	this	indicates	that	the	subject	is	indifferent	between	gambling	on	a	draw	from	urn	
K10	that	is	composed	of	16	chips	in	their	selected	color	versus	gambling	on	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	
A	matched	probability	above	(below)	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	of	0.1	implies	ambiguity	
loving	(averse)	behavior.	
To	elicit	m(0.9)	we	run	the	same	protocol	as	discussed	before,	only	now	there	are	nine	
winning	 colors,	 defined	 as	 the	 nine	 colors	 that	 were	 not	 selected	 by	 the	 participant	 (the	
complement	of	urn	U10	with	1	winning	color).	Here	X1	was	60	chips	and	X20	was	98	chips.	When	
m(0.9)	is	0.7,	for	instance,	the	participant	indicated	to	be	indifferent	between	a	draw	from	urn	
K10	filled	with	70	chips,	colored	by	any	of	the	nine	winning	colors,	versus	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	
For	all	 three	 list	procedures,	we	designed	the	program	in	such	a	way	that	participants	
could	only	switch	once.	Subjects	who	immediately	‘switched’	to	option	B	in	row	1	received	the	
amount	of	chips	in	row	1	as	their	matching	probability.	At	the	other	extreme,	subjects	who	never	
switched	to	Option	B	received	the	amount	of	chips	in	row	20	as	their	matching	probability.	We	
classified	a	participant	as	ambiguity	neutral	if	(s)he	switched	from	option	A	to	option	B	when	the	
risky	urn	was	in	line	with	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	(for	the	two-color	urn	U2	this	is	row	
10	in	Figure	A1	in	Appendix	A).	
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AAp	refers	to	the	degree	of	ambiguity	aversion	for	each	uncertain	event	with	ambiguity-
neutral	probability	p.	We	compute	the	AAp	with	each	individual’s	matched	probability	as	follows:	
	
AA0.1	=	0.1	–	m(0.1)	
AA0.5	=	0.5	–	m(0.5)	
AA0.9	=	0.9	–	m(0.9)	
	
We	 use	 the	method	 developed	 by	 Abdellaoui	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 to	 extract	 two	 indices:	 ambiguity	
aversion	 and	 likelihood	 insensitivity.	 For	 each	 participant	 we	 estimate	 the	 best-fitting	 line	
between	p	and	m(p),	by	means	of	OLS	on	the	open	interval	(0,1).	We	refer	to	the	intercept	with	
c,	and	the	slope	with	s.	Finally,	we	compute	d	=	1	–	c	–s,	which	 is	 the	distance	from	1	at	 the	
regression	line	where	p	=	1.	Based	on	these	three	parameters,	we	define:	
	
Index	a	=	1	–	s	(=	c	+	d),	which	is	the	index	of	likelihood	insensitivity,	and	
Index	b	=	1-s-2c	(=	d	–	c),	which	is	the	index	of	ambiguity	aversion.	
	
Index	b	is	an	anti-index	of	the	average	height	of	the	curve	and	refers	to	a	global	index	of	ambiguity	
aversion.	Index	a	on	the	other	hand	is	an	anti-index	of	the	steepness	of	the	curve	and	it	reflects	
the	neglect	to	sufficiently	differentiate	between	intermediate	levels	of	likelihood	(Wakker,	2010;	
Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Dimmock,	 Kouwenberg	 and	 Wakker,	 2016b).	 The	 most	 common	
behavioral	 pattern	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 both	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	 insensitivity	
(Wakker,	2010).	
	
3.2	Consistency	
In	order	to	test	the	consistency	of	participants’	preferences	elicited	in	the	multiple	choice	
list,	we	also	administer	a	direct	binominal	choice	between	each	of	the	three	ambiguous	likelihood	
events	and	a	risky	urn	defined	by	their	respective	ambiguity	neutral	probabilities	of	0.1,	0.5	and	
0.9.	Please	see	Figure	A4	(in	Appendix	A)	for	an	illustration	of	the	consistency	check	for	the	two-
color	ambiguous	urn	U2.		
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This	binominal	choice	was	elicited	before	participants	were	confronted	with	the	choice	
list	procedure.	For	a	consistent	decision-maker,	identical	preferences	should	emerge	in	the	direct	
choice	(Figure	A4	in	Appendix	A)	as	in	the	row	from	the	choice	list	where	the	risky	urn	was	in	line	
with	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	(row	10	in	Figure	A1	in	section	1	of	the	Appendix).	The	
direct	comparison	between	the	ambiguous	and	risky	urn	allows	us	to	assess	the	robustness	of	
participants’	preferences.		
The	consistency	rates	(in	percentages	of	the	total	participant	pool)	are	81.97%,	76.39%	
and	94.42%	for	the	three	likelihoods	of	0.5,	0.1	and	0.9,	respectively.	Our	consistency	rates	are	
higher	than	Dimmock,	Kouwenberg	and	Wakker	(2016b)	and	Dimmock	et	al.	(2016a),	and	in	line	
with	Kocher,	Lahno	and	Trautmann	(2015).	Overall,	69.66%	(n=136)	of	our	participants	showed	a	
consistent	pattern	for	all	three	likelihoods	(henceforth	‘consistent	sample’).	For	robustness	we	
rerun	all	our	analyses	on	our	consistent	sample	(see	Models	5	and	6	in	Table	C3	in	Appendix	C).	
	
3.3	Risk	aversion	
We	also	measure	 individuals’	 risk	preferences.	Within	the	same	framing	as	above	(see	
Figure	A5	in	Appendix	A)	we	elicited	subjects’	certainty	equivalent	to	a	draw	from	a	two-color	
risky	urn	(equivalent	to	K2	with	10	chips	and	a	probability	of	0.5).	Participants	are	informed	that	
a	drawn	chip	corresponding	to	their	selected	color	(yellow	or	green)	would	lead	to	a	gain	of	€	15,	
else	they	win	nothing.	
Participants	had	to	select,	 in	each	row	in	a	choice	 list	 format	of	20	rows	 in	total,	 their	
preference	between	drawing	 a	 chip	 from	 the	 risky	urn	 and	 receiving	 a	 sure	payoff.	 The	 sure	
payoff	increased	with	each	row	and	reached	a	maximum	amount	of	€	15	at	row	20.	At	some	point	
participants	switched	from	choosing	the	risky	urn	to	the	sure	option.	We	take	the	midpoint	of	
the	two	sure	payoffs	before	and	at	the	switching	point	as	each	participant’s	certainty	equivalent	
(CE).	As	a	measure	of	individual	risk	aversion	we	use:	r	=	1	–	CE/15	(Wakker,	2010).	A	value	of	r	
larger	(smaller),	than	0.5,	indicates	risk	aversion	(risk	seekingness).	
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3.4	Questionnaire	
After	we	elicited	participants’	matching	probabilities	and	their	preference	towards	risk,	
we	administered	a	questionnaire.	We	specifically	asked	if	they	were	familiar	with	DUO	before	
they	answered	subsequent	questions.	All	students	were	well	aware	of	the	existence	of	DUO.		
The	 questionnaire	 consisted	 of	 three	 parts.	 Part	 1	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 dealt	 with	
questions	concerning	their	borrowing	behavior.	The	main	questions	we	use	for	our	analyses	ask	
whether	or	not	they	borrow,	and	if	so,	how	much	they	borrow.	In	part	1	we	also	conducted	a	
cognitive	reflection	test	(Frederick,	2005)	and	a	financial	literacy	test	(Lusardi	and	Mitchel,	2011).	
Both	 these	 tests	 contained	 three	questions	and	each	participant	 received	a	normalized	 score	
between	0-1	depending	on	the	amount	of	correct	answers.	
Part	2	of	the	questionnaire	included	demographic	questions	such	as	age,	gender,	living	
situation,	study	year	and	study	topic.	
The	last	part	of	the	questionnaire,	part	3,	was	the	life	orientation	test,	which	measured	
general	optimism	and	pessimism	(Scheier	and	Carver,	1985;	Scheier,	Carver	and	Bridges,	1994).	
Participants	 indicated	 on	 a	 5-point	 Likert	 scale	 (scored	with	 a	 range	 from	0-4)	 if	 they	 totally	
(dis)agreed	with	the	statement	being	posed.	A	maximum	score	of	24,	respectively	0,	means	an	
extremely	optimistic	and	pessimistic	view	on	life.4	
	
3.5	Procedures	
The	experiments	were	conducted	at	NSM	laboratory	(Nijmegen	School	of	Management)	
at	 the	 Radboud	 University	 Nijmegen	 and	 ELSE	 (Experimental	 Laboratory	 for	 Sociology	 and	
Economics)	at	the	University	of	Utrecht	in	March	2014.	233	participants	-	130	females	and	103	
males	-	participated	in	our	study.	The	experiments	were	computerized	using	the	software	z-Tree	
(Fischbacher,	2007).	All	participants	had	to	answer	comprehension	questions	before	each	task.	
																																								 																				
4	We	added	this	part	to	the	questionnaire	as	we	were	interested	to	study	if	the	optimism	and	pessimism	scores	from	
this	life	orientation	test	would	correlate	with	the	optimism	and	pessimism	labels	used	to	describe	overweighting	of	
low	likelihoods,	respectively	underweighting	of	high	likelihood	events	(See	Table	C1	in	Appendix	C).	As	scores	on	the	
life	orientation	test	had	no	relationship	with	borrowing	behavior,	likelihood	insensitivity	and	ambiguity	aversion	we	
do	not	report	them	in	our	main	results	section.		
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We	checked	their	answers	and,	in	case	of	mistakes,	privately	explained	the	correct	answer	before	
all	participants	were	allowed	to	start	the	task.	
There	was	a	fixed	order	of	tasks.	The	matched	probabilities	were	elicited	in	the	following	
order:	m(0.5),	m(0.1)	and	m(0.9).	This	is	in	line	with	procedures	from	Dimmock,	Kouwenberg	and	
Wakker	 (2016b)	 and	 Dimmock	 et	 al,	 (2016a).	 Subsequently	 we	 elicited	 participants’	 risk	
preferences.	Finally,	participants	filled	in	the	questionnaire	before	any	feedback	was	given	on	the	
results	and	payment	of	the	experimental	tasks.	
Participants	received	a	sure	amount	of	€4	as	show-up	fee.	At	the	end	of	each	session	the	
computer	would	randomly	select	one	choice	from	one	of	the	four	experimental	tasks:	one	row	
from	one	of	the	choice	lists	used	to	elicit	the	matching	probabilities	of	the	ambiguous	likelihood	
events	of	0.1,	0.5	and	0.9	and	participants’	risk	preferences.	This	randomly	selected	choice	was	
played	out	for	real	by	letting	participants	select	a	chip	from	either	urn	U2,	urn	U10	or	from	a	risky	
urn.	If	a	participant	would	have	to	draw	a	chip	from	the	risky	urn,	we	would	compose	an	‘urn’	in	
front	of	their	eyes	by	filling	it	with	the	amount	of	chips	in	their	selected	color	(corresponding	to	
the	selected	row).		
Subjects	were	paid,	in	cash	and	in	private,	€12.15	on	average	(including	show-up	fee)	for	
a	session	lasting	about	one	and	a	half	hour	
The	production	of	the	unknown	urns	U2	and	U10	was	explained	very	carefully	at	the	start	
of	the	experiment.	We	used	four	different	production	methods	to	construct	urns	U2	and	U10,	
namely	‘human’,	‘compound’,	‘unknown’	and	‘nature’.5	During	the	whole	experiment	urn	U2	and	
urn	U10	were	visibly	placed	in	the	laboratory	so	that	any	suspicion	participants	could	have	had	
with	regard	to	potential	manipulation	of	the	ambiguous	urns	was	eliminated.		
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
5	 The	 four	 production	 methods	 were	 implemented	 as	 four	 separate	 treatments	 randomized	 over	 17	 different	
sessions	in	a	between-subjects	design.	In	a	companion	paper	we	focus	on	the	question	if	ambiguity	aversion	and	
likelihood	 insensitivity	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 ambiguous	 urn.	 All	 results	 in	 this	 paper	 remain	
qualitatively	valid	when	including	dummies	for	either	sessions	or	for	production	methods	in	our	statistical	models.	
Please	see	Appendix	B	for	a	more	detailed	explanation	of	the	production	methods	and	Appendix	C	for	the	results	of	
the	robustness	analyses	(Table	C4).	
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4.	Results	
	
4.1	Sample	descriptives	
We	excluded	five	participants	from	our	total	set	of	233	participants.	Three	participants	turned	
out	not	to	be	a	student	in	violation	of	our	selection	criteria.	Two	participants	did	not	report	their	
income,	which	we	use	as	a	control	variable	in	our	analyses.	All	analyses	are	conducted	with	the	
remaining	228	participants.	
Table	1	shows	that	33%	of	our	subjects	borrow	money	at	DUO	on	a	monthly	basis.	The	
average	amount	borrowed	is	€388.16	per	month.6	Both	these	figures	are	very	consistent	with	
findings	from	much	larger	representative	samples	(Biermans	and	Budil-Nadvorníková,	2003;	van	
den	Broek	and	van	de	Wiel,	2005;	Oosterbeek	and	van	den	Broek,	2009;	Kreetz,	van	der	Schors	
and	van	der	Burg,	2012).	Table	1	also	shows	that	borrowers	live	more	frequently	on	their	own,	
have	higher	living	expenses,	more	siblings,	are	further	progressed	in	their	study	(in	terms	of	study	
years),	 and	 older	 than	 non-borrowers	 (p<0.05,	 two-sample	 t-test).	 Also,	 the	 total	 amount	 of	
income	is	higher	for	borrowers	than	for	non-borrowers;	this	may	indicate	that	borrowers	need	
to	offset	higher	living	expenses.		
	
Table	1:	 		 	
Variables:	 Borrowers	 Non-borrowers	 Overall	 	
N	(proportion)	 76	(32.62%)	 157	(67.38%)	 233	(100%)	 	
Income	 €	661.04	 €	556.88	 €	602.10	 	
Age	 21.92	 21.05	 21.68	 	
Siblings	 1.83	 1.61	 1.67	 	
Female	 56.58%	 55.41%	 55.79%	 	
Economics	study	 9.21%	 24.20%	 19.31%	 	
Live	on	own	 85.53%	 70.70%	 75.54%	 	
Study	years	 2.47	 1.88	 2.08	 	
Living	expenses	 €	568.42	 €	426.64	 €	473.90	 	
Amount	borrowed	 €	388.16	 €	0	 €	126.61	 	
	
																																								 																				
6	This	amount	is	higher	than	the	maximum	of	€301.27	per	month,	because	many	students	study	longer	than	four	
years,	after	which	they	can	borrow	up	to	€916.96	(see	Chapter	2	of	this	paper).	
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4.2	Ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	
Table	2	shows	that,	on	average,	subjects	have	matching	probabilities	below	the	ambiguity	neutral	
probabilities	of	0.5	and	0.9	and	overweight	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	of	0.1.	This	pattern	
is	both	consistent	with	ambiguity	aversion	(mean	index	b	value	of	0.097,	which	is	significantly	
higher	than	0:	t(227)=13.235,	p<0.001	two-tailed)	and	likelihood	insensitivity	(mean	index	a	value	
of	 0.254,	 which	 is	 significantly	 higher	 than	 0:	 t(227)=22.712,	 p<0.001	 two-tailed).	 Finally,	
participants	can	be	characterized	as	risk	averse	(mean	value	of	0.547,	which	is	significantly	higher	
than	0.5:	t(227)=5.35,	p<0.001	two-tailed).	For	the	consistent	sample,	the	mean	values	of	index	
b,	a	and	risk	aversion	are	respectively	0.110,	0.244	and	0.542	and	these	values	are	significantly	
different	from	0	and	0.5	(p<0.001	two-tailed).	
	
Table	2:	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Variable									 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	 	 	 	
m(0.1)	 0.142	 0.064	 0.02	 0.40	 	 	 	
m(0.5)	 0.475	 0.083	 0.23	 0.8	 	 	 	
m(0.9)	 0.738	 0.110	 0.60	 0.98	 	 	 	
AA0.1	 -0.042	 0.065	 -0.30	 0.08	 	 	 	
AA0.5	 0.025	 0.083	 -0.30	 0.27	 	 	 	
AA0.9	 0.162	 0.110	 -0.08	 0.3	 	 	 	
Index	b	(ambiguity	aversion)	 0.097	 0.110	 -0.45	 0.31	 	 	 	
Index	a	(likelihood	insensitivity)	 0.254	 0.169	 -0.2	 0.89	 	 	 	
Risk	aversion	 0.547	 0.134	 0	 0.925	 	 	 	
	
In	 Table	 3	 the	 percentages	 of	 participants	who	 can	 either	 be	 classified	 as	 ambiguity	 averse,	
neutral	 or	 seeking	 are	 distinguished	 for	 the	 three	 different	 likelihoods.	 In	 coherence	 with	 a	
positive	 value	 of	 likelihood	 insensitivity,	 the	 percentage	 of	 ambiguity	 averse	 (seeking)	
participants	increases	(decreases)	in	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability.7	
	
Table	3:	 		 	 	
Likelihood	 0.1	 0.5	 0.9	 	 	
Ambiguity	averse	 13	(6%)	 87	(38%)	 197	(86%)	 	 	
Ambiguity	neutral	 59	(26%)	 76	(33%)	 20	(9%)	 	 	
Ambiguity	seeking	 156	(68%)	 65	(29%)	 11	(5%)	 	 	
																																								 																				
7	 Please	 see	 Tables	 C1	 and	 C2	 in	 Appendix	 C	 for	 more	 descriptive	 data	 on	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	
insensitivity.	
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4.3	Lab-elicited	measures	and	borrowing	behavior	
In	order	to	test	if	our	experimental	measures	from	the	laboratory	relate	to	the	decision	
to	take	out	a	student	loan,	we	first	run	a	logistical	regression	model	with	the	borrowing	decision	
as	dependent	variable.	This	dependent	variable	is	a	dichotomous	variable,	with	1	indicating	if	a	
student	borrows,	irrespective	of	how	much,	and	0	indicating	when	a	student	does	not	borrow.	
We	 find	 marginally	 significant	 (p<0.1)	 trends	 of	 financial	 literacy,	 studying	 economics,	 and	
whether	one	lives	on	her	own	on	the	decision	to	borrow	(Table	4).	Neither	ambiguity	aversion	
nor	likelihood	insensitivity	nor	risk	aversion,	however,	are	associated	with	the	decision	to	take	
out	a	student	loan.8		
Please	recall	from	Table	1	that	33%	of	our	subjects	borrow	money	monthly	at	DUO.	We	
therefore	also	analyze	the	role	between	our	experimental	measures	and	the	amount	borrowers	
in	our	student	population	borrow,	given	that	students	took	out	a	loan	(n=76).	A	Pearson	product-
moment	correlation	shows	a	significant	negative	correlation	between	ambiguity	aversion	(index	
b)	and	the	amount	a	student	borrows	(r=-0.233,	p<0.05).	We	perform	several	additional	analyses	
to	test	the	validity	of	this	pairwise	correlation.	Firstly,	we	run	an	OLS	regression	on	the	group	of	
borrowers	(n=76)	with	the	amount	borrowed	(on	a	monthly	basis)	as	dependent	variable	(see	
Appendix	C,	Table	C3).	The	previously	found	negative	bivariate	relationship	between	borrowers’	
ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 borrow	 remains	 significantly	 valid	 in	 a	multivariate	
setting	(see	models	1-4	in	Table	C3	in	Appendix	C).	This	result	is	not	influenced	when	we	perform	
the	same	analyses	and	control	for	session	effects	and	production	methods	(see	Appendix	C,	Table	
C4).	
	Importantly,	however,	when	we	run	the	same	models	with	the	consistent	sample	(n=46,	
see	models	5	and	6	 in	Table	C3	 in	Appendix	C),	 the	significant	effect	of	borrowers’	ambiguity	
aversion	on	the	amount	they	borrow	monthly	vanishes.	Also,	we	cannot	confirm	our	previously	
found	result	when	we	run	a	Tobit	regression	on	the	whole	sample	and	model	the	null-borrowers	
as	left-censored	observations	(see	Appendix	C,	Table	C5).	
	
	
																																								 																				
8	Ambiguity	aversion	at	p=0.5	in	Model	6	is	the	only	exception,	but	is	only	weakly	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	
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Table	4:	Determinants	of	borrowing	behavior	(logistical	regression;	1	=	yes,	I	borrow)	
Do	you	borrow	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	
Index	b	 0.657																							
(1.424)	
0.424																									
(1.481)	
		 		 2.080																									
(2.351)	
		
		 		 		
Index	a	 0.176																													
(0.941)	
0.145																														
(0.956)	
		 		 -0.150																														
(1.294)			 		 		
AA0.1	 		 		 -1.419																																											
(2.473)	
-1.939																																											
(2.514)	
-2.841																																											
(3.784)	
AA0.5	 		 		 2.007																																											
(1.946)	
2.211																																												
(1.972)	
5.900*																																												
(3.234)	
AA0.9	 		 		 0.070																																									
(1.396)	
-0.278 																						
(1.463)	
-0.334																																								
(2.014)	
Risk	aversion	 		 -1.108																																		
(1.143)	
-1.111																																															
(1.148)	
-1.188																																		
(1.519)	
-0.270 																																						
(1.546)	
Financial	literacy	 		 -.449*																																				
(0.257)	
-0.487*																																											
(0.261)	
-.415 														
(0.345)	
-0.447 																																	
(0.351)	
Cognitive	
reflection	test	
		 -0.126																																					
(0.449)	
-0.094																																								
(0.451)	
-1.070*																																					
(0.543)	
-1.073 																											
(0.664)	
Income	 0.000																													
(0.000)	
0.000																													
(0.000)	
0.000																													
(0.000)	
0.000																													
(0.000)	
0.000																													
(0.000)	
0.000 																									
(0.000)	
Study	years	 0.049																																													
(0.062)	
0.051																																													
(0.063)	
0.051																																													
(0.062)	
0.053																																													
(0.063)	
0.057																																													
(0.089)	
0.053 																									
(0.092)	
Female	 0.021																																			
(0.305)	
-0.056 																							
(0.317)	
0.031 																											
(0.306)	
-0.048 																	
(0.319)	
-0.769*																																			
(0.447)	
-0.791* 																								
(0.456)	
Economic	study	 -1.070**																																					
(0.450)	
-0.803*																																					
(0.470)	
-1.067**																																		
(0.451)	
-0.788*																																	
(0.470)	
-1.543**																																					
(0.713)	
-1.512* 																				
(0.713)	
Siblings	 0.095																																
(0.122)	
0.073																																
(0.126)	
0.083																																
(0.122)	
0.058																																					
(0.126)	
-0.047 																								
(0.169)	
-0.058 																									
(0.170)	
Live	on	own	 0.704*																																					
(0.406)	
0.732*																																					
(0.414)	
0.728*																																																					
(0.408)	
0.762*																																					
(0.415)	
1.603*** 																										
(0.611)	
1.728*** 																									
(0.622)	
Constant	 -1.694	
(0.538)	
0.020	
(0.984)	
-1.710	
(0.541)	
0.074	
(0.992)	
-1.556	
(0.699)	
0.074	
(1.305)	
Observations	 228	 228	 228	 228	 136	 136	
Consistent	sample	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	
LR	Chi2	 chi2(8)	=	
17.26	
chi2(11)	=	
21.90	
chi2(9)	=	
18.13	
chi2(12)	=	
23.20	
chi2(8)	=	
18.61	
chi2(11)	=	
23.50	
Prob	>	Chi2	 0.0276	 0.0251	 0.0337	 0.0261	 0.0171	 0.0150	
Pseudo	R-squared	 0.0595	 0.0755	 0.0624	 0.0799	 0.135	 0.0799	
***,**,*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.		
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This	 led	us	to	more	carefully	 look	at	our	sample	of	borrowers.	We	found	one	extreme	
outlier	(see	Figure	C6	in	Appendix	C)	who	was	at	the	same	time	highly	ambiguity	seeking	and	who	
belonged	to	the	highest	5%	percentile	of	amount	borrowed	(and	was	not	part	of	the	consistent	
sample).	When	we	reran	our	OLS	models	 (see	Table	C3	 in	Appendix	C)	and	removed	this	one	
outlier,	the	earlier	reported	relationship	between	ambiguity	aversion	and	amount	borrowed	was	
not	present	anymore.	Although	we	have	low	power,	insignificance	is	not	driven	by	large	standard	
error,	but	rather	by	an	absence	of	an	effect.	
In	Section	1	and	2	of	this	paper	we	argue	that	there	is	ambiguity	over	the	exact	interest	
rates	for	the	student	loan.	Yet,	students	who	take	out	a	loan	late	in	their	studies,	e.g.	shortly	after	
the	last	adjustment	of	the	interest	rates,	should	have	better	information	to	assess	the	future	debt	
they	have	to	pay	off	than	others	and	hence	suffer	from	less	ambiguity.	To	check	whether	the	
missing	relationship	is	driven	by	students	in	higher	years,	we	reran	all	our	regressions	with	first-	
and	second-year	students	only	(unreported).	The	sample	size	was	n=159	(original	n=228),	which	
shows	that	the	large	majority	of	students	in	the	original	sample	were	quite	far	from	graduation	
and	loan	repayment.	The	results	of	all	our	robustness	checks	(both	 logit	and	OLS)	are	near	to	
identical	to	the	reported	results.	
Hence,	 overall,	 we	 can	 therefore	 conclude	 that	 our	 results	 show	 no	 relationship	 (a)	
between	the	decision	to	borrow	and	ambiguity	or	risk	measures	and	(b)	between	the	amount	
borrowed	and	our	ambiguity	and	risk	measures	(conditional	on	borrowing	and	after	eliminating	
a	single	outlier).	
	
5.	Discussion	and	conclusion	
	 This	study	is	part	of	a	relatively	new	stream	in	decision	research	that	attempts	to	relate	
experimentally	elicited	ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	to	real	life	decision-making	
outside	the	laboratory.	We	used	advanced	methods	to	elicit	ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	
insensitivity	 in	a	well-controlled	 laboratory	setting	and	 relate	 it	 to	Dutch	students’	borrowing	
behavior	in	our	experimental	population.		
	 Dutch	students	face	a	multitude	of	ambiguous	elements	in	the	decision	to	take	out	a	loan,	
including	 uncertain	 interest	 rates.	 We	 hypothesized	 that	 students	 who	 are	 more	 ambiguity	
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averse	will	not	borrow	or	borrow	less	than	other	students.	Furthermore,	we	hypothesized	that	
students	who	exhibit	high	likelihood	insensitivity	will	underweight	the	probability	that	the	loan	
will	 benefit	 them	 and	 overweight	 the	 cost	 and	 ease	 of	 repayment.	 Altogether,	 this	 would	
aggravate	the	relationship	between	ambiguity	aversion	and	borrowing	behavior	even	more.	
Our	results	indicate	no	relationship	between	ambiguity	aversion,	risk	aversion,	likelihood	
insensitivity	and	students’	borrowing	behavior.	Our	parameters	of	interest	do	not	influence	the	
decision	to	take	out	a	 loan	or	the	amount	borrowers	are	willing	to	 loan.	Contrary	to	previous	
results	(Eckel	et	al.,	2007,	Oosterbeek	and	van	den	Broek,	2009)	we	find	no	relationship	between	
individuals’	risk	aversion	and	borrowing	behavior.	
As	discussed	 in	section	2	of	 this	paper,	 the	cohort	of	students	that	participated	 in	our	
study	received	a	basic	scholarship	from	the	government	along	with	the	possibility	to	take	out	a	
study	 loan.	 As	 the	 Dutch	 government	 faces	 pressures	 to	 reduce	 costs,	 fewer	 resources	 are	
allocated	to	education.	One	of	the	recent	consequences	is	that	new	cohorts	of	Dutch	students	
who	started	as	of	September	2015	will	receive	no	monthly	basic	scholarship	anymore	and	will	
have	to	exclusively	rely	on	student	loans.		
From	 countries	 with	 higher	 educational	 fees,	 results	 show	 that	 students,	 who	 are	
reluctant	to	borrow,	choose	more	frequently	to	work	part-time,	opt	for	a	lower	cost	institution,	
or	study	part-time	(Institute	for	Higher	Education	Policy,	2008).	These	are	all	factors	that	increase	
the	risk	of	study	dropout.	Next	to	this	potential	risk	of	higher	dropout	rates,	a	2.1%	decline	in	the	
amount	of	Dutch	students	pursuing	higher	education	is	predicted	as	a	consequence	of	this	new	
policy	(Berkhout	and	van	der	Werff,	2014).	
Not	surprisingly,	the	decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan	appears	to	be	primarily	driven	by	
financial	constraints.	We	find	that	borrowers	live	more	frequently	on	their	own,	have	higher	living	
expenses,	more	siblings,	are	further	progressed	in	their	study	(in	terms	of	study	years),	and	older	
than	non-borrowers.	What	is	somewhat	surprising,	however,	is	that	risk	and	ambiguity	aversion	
from	 the	 lab	 are	 unable	 to	 detect	 any	 additional	 effects	 in	 students’	 borrowing	 behavior.	
Irrespective	of	students’	lab-elicited	preferences	for	risk	and	ambiguity,	some	students	have	no	
alternative	but	 to	 take	out	a	 student	 loan	 in	order	 to	attain	education.	And	vice	versa,	 some	
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students	are	not	restricted	to	borrowing,	and	will	not	do	so,	even	if	they	appear	to	be	more	risk	
and	ambiguity	seeking	in	the	lab.		
A	 limitation	 in	 our	 study	 setup	 is	 that	we	 have	 restricted	 the	 elicitation	 of	 ambiguity	
aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	to	the	gain	domain.	If	students’	decision	to	take	out	a	study	
loan	is	driven	by	a	fear	of	not	being	able	to	repay	their	study	debts	in	the	future,	our	null-finding	
between	likelihood	insensitivity	and	student	borrowing	may	have	come	from	the	fact	that	we	did	
not	elicit	matching	probabilities	for	an	ambiguous	prospect	in	the	loss	domain.	Previous	research	
has	 shown	 that	 the	 common	 pattern	 of	 over-	 and	 underweighting	 of	 low	 respectively	 high	
likelihood	events	in	the	gain	domain	is	completely	reversed	in	the	loss	domain	(Di	Mauro	and	
Maffioletti,	2004;	Vieider,	Martinsson	and	Medhin,	2012).	In	the	Netherlands	the	default	rate	on	
student	loans	was	11%	in	2009	and	15.63%	in	2013	(Dutch	Ministry	of	Education,	2014)	and	in	
the	United	States	the	2013	national	cohort	default	rate	was	11%	(Federal	Student	Aid,	2016).	
Hence,	 more	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 investigate	 how	 the	 expectation	 of	 defaults	 relates	 to	
ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	insensitivity	in	the	loss	domain.	
Overall,	the	results	of	this	study	and	other	experimental	evidence	regarding	the	external	
validity	 of	 lab-measured	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	 insensitivity	 remain	 mixed	 and	
unconvincing.	For	risk	measurements	Friedman	et	al.	(2014)	argued	that	the	definition,	modelling	
and	elicitation	of	risk	does	not	(yet)	adequately	relate	to	the	perceived	risk	that	people	face	in	
their	 daily	 lives.	We	 extend	 this	 argument	 to	measures	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 likelihood	
insensitivity	in	the	lab	in	combination	with	student	borrowing	behavior	in	the	field.	
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Appendix	A	
	
	
Figure	A1:	table	setup	for	eliciting	m(0.5).	Screenshot	from	our	zTree	program.	
Figure	A2:	table	setup	for	eliciting	m(0.1).	Screenshot	from	our	zTree	program.	
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Figure	A4:	Choice	screen	‘consistency	check’	(with	green	as	illustration)	
Figure	A3:	table	setup	for	eliciting	m(0.9).	Screenshot	from	our	zTree	program.	
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Figure	A5:	table	setup	for	eliciting	risk	preferences.	Screenshot	from	our	zTree	program.	
28	
	
Appendix	B	
	
In	this	study	we	used	four	different	production	methods	to	construct	urns	U2	and	U10.	These	
production	 methods	 were	 implemented	 as	 four	 separate	 treatments,	 randomized	 over	 17	
different	 sessions.	 In	a	 companion	paper	we	 focus	on	 the	question	 if	 ambiguity	attitudes	are	
influenced	by	the	construction	of	an	ambiguous	urn	via	a	between-subjects	design.	For	internal	
use,	 we	 labeled	 the	 production	methods	 as:	 ‘unknown’	 (n=54),	 ‘human’	 (n=55),	 ‘compound’	
(n=64)	and	‘nature’	(n=60).		
Before	 participants	 indicated	 their	 choices	 in	 the	 multiple	 list	 procedure,	 but	 after	
participants	had	selected	their	color,	we	explained	the	production	method	and	produced	urns	
U2	and	U10.	After	the	urns	were	composed,	they	were	placed	in	front	of	the	laboratory	where	
all	 participants	 could	 see	 them	 throughout	 the	 whole	 session.	 In	 this	 way	 we	 removed	 any	
suspicion	that	the	urns	could	be	manipulated	by	the	experimenters	after	they	were	produced.			
In	the	unknown	production	method	we,	the	experimenters,	composed	both	ambiguous	
urns	before	the	session	started	without	telling	participants	how	the	urns	were	composed.		
For	the	remaining	three	production	methods	we	asked	a	randomly	drawn	participant	(the	
‘producer’)	to	compose	both	ambiguous	urns	U2	and	U10.	The	instructions	we	gave	the	producer	
of	the	urns	were	publicly	explained	to	all	participants.	The	producer	then	composed	these	urns	
in	private.	Hence,	both	the	experimenters	and	the	participants	were	unaware	of	the	composition	
of	the	urns.	After	the	producer	composed	the	urns,	she	was	excused	from	the	session.		
The	human	production	method	implied	that	the	randomly	selected	participant	produced	
urns	U2	and	U10	in	any	preferred	combination	of	two	colors	(for	urn	U2)	or	ten	colors	(for	urn	
U10).	Hence,	the	human	production	method	was	very	similar	to	the	unknown	production	method	
with	the	exception	that	not	the	experimenters	but	a	participant	composed	the	urn.	
In	the	nature	and	compound	production	method,	the	producer	was	required	to	compose	
the	urns	 based	on	 temperatures	 (for	 nature)	 and	 randomly	drawn	numbers	 (for	 compound).	
After	 the	 sessions	 participants	 were	 able	 to	 check	 whether	 the	 producer	 adhered	 to	 this	
procedure	and	this	was	openly	communicated	to	everybody	in	the	room	(including	the	producer).	
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In	 the	 nature	 production	 method	 condition,	 the	 producer	 had	 to	 look	 up	 the	 actual	
temperatures	in	the	cities	Sydney	and	Warschau	for	urn	U2	and	10	other	publicly	revealed	cities	
around	the	world	for	urn	U10	(via	the	website	Weatherbug,	which	updates	current	temperatures	
every	5	minutes).	Urn	U2	was	produced	based	on	the	first	number	behind	the	comma	of	 the	
current	temperatures	in	Sydney	and	Warschau.	For	example,	if	it	was	34.6	and	8.2	degrees	Celsius	
in	 Sydney	 respectively	 Warschau,	 then	 the	 randomly	 selected	 participant	 was	 instructed	 to	
compose	urn	U2	with	62	green	chips	(6+2)	and	38	yellow	chips	(100-62).	For	Urn	U10,	the	first	
number	behind	the	comma	of	the	temperatures	in	the	10	cities	had	to	be	summed	up.	Then	each	
of	the	ten	numbers	had	to	be	divided	by	the	sum	and	rounded	to	the	nearest	integer.	These	ten	
rounded	percentages	determined	the	number	with	which	each	chip	color	was	represented	in	urn	
U10.		
Finally,	 the	 compound	 production	method	was	 very	 similar	 as	 the	 nature	 production	
method,	only	that	the	numbers	did	not	stem	from	temperatures,	but	were	randomly	drawn	from	
envelopes.	The	producer	had	to	draw	one	number	from	an	envelope	filled	with	numbers	from	0	
to	100.	The	number	she	drew	determined	 the	number	of	green	chips	and	 the	 remainder	 the	
number	of	red	chips	 in	urn	U2.	For	urn	U10	the	randomly	drawn	participant	had	to	draw	ten	
numbers	from	ten	separate	envelopes	filled	with	numbers	between	0-9.	These	ten	numbers	were	
summed	before	each	number	separately	had	to	be	divided	by	the	sum	and	rounded.	Again,	these	
ten	rounded	numbers	determined	the	number	with	which	each	chip	color	was	represented	in	
urn	U10.	
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Appendix	C	
	
In	the	section	below	we	provide	additional	descriptive	analyses	and	perform	robustness	analyses	
as	also	explained	in	the	results	section	of	this	paper.	
Table	C1	shows	correlations	between	our	most	important	experimental	variables.	Similar	
to	previous	 research	we	also	 find	quite	 some	 correlations	between	our	measures	 (Dimmock,	
Kouwenberg	and	Wakker,	2016b;	Dimmock	et	al.,	2016a).	The	indices	of	ambiguity	aversion	and	
likelihood	 insensitivity	 are	 significantly	 positively	 correlated.	 Risk	 is	 positively	 correlated	with	
ambiguity	aversion,	and	weakly	with	likelihood	insensitivity.	As	financial	literacy	and	scores	on	
the	cognitive	reflection	test	are	both	negatively	correlated	with	ambiguity	aversion	and	likelihood	
insensitivity,	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 can	 somewhat	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 cognitive	 bias	 (as	 also	 put	
forward	by	Wakker	(2010)).	Surprisingly	general	optimism	and	pessimism	do	not	correlate	with	
matching	 probabilities	 of	 0.1,	 respectively	 0.9.	 This	 indicates	 that	 general	 optimism	 and	
pessimism	 are	 different	 from	 the	 optimism	 and	 pessimism	 labels	 we	 use	 when	 we	 refer	 to	
participants,	that	respectively	overweight	and	underweight	likelihoods	of	0.1	and	0.9.		
	
Table	C1:	Correlation	matrix	 	    		 		
Variable	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 Index	b	 Index	a	 AA0.1	 AA0.5	 AA0.9	 Risk	
Index	b	 1	 	     
Index	a		 0.321***	 1	 	    
AA0.1	 0.471***	 -0.598***	 1	 	   
AA0.5	 0.732***	 -0.059	 0.354***	 1	 	  
AA0.9	 0.674***	 0.881***	 -0.148**	 0.136**	 1	 	
Risk	 0.132**	 0.108*	 0.019	 0.056	 0.145**	 1	
Optimism	 -0.074	 -0.034	 -0.038	 -0.033	 -0.064	 -0.076	
Financial	Literacy	 -0.191***	 -0.122*	 -0.081	 -0.055	 -0.198**	 0.065	
Cognitive	reflection	test	 -0.234***	 -0.129**	 -0.054	 -0.172***	 -0.190***	 0.086	
	
Table	C2	shows	that	bivariate	correlations	between	ambiguity	aversion	(index	b)	and	risk,	
financial	 literacy	 and	 scores	 on	 the	 cognitive	 reflection	 test	 hold	 when	 controlling	 for	 other	
demographic	 variables.	 Only	 the	 effect	 of	 risk	 remains	 prevalent,	 however,	 when	 explaining	
likelihood	insensitivity	in	a	multivariate	model.	
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Table	C2:	Ambiguity	preferences	and	likelihood	insensitivity	explained	by	demographic	
variables	(OLS	estimation)	
	 Index	b	 Index	a	 AA0.1	 AA0.5	 AA0.9	
Risk	aversion	 0.136**	(0.055)	
0.157*				
(0.088)	
0.011	
(0.034)	
0.056							
(0.043)	
0.136**						
(0.055)	
Financial	literacy	 -0.026**				(0.012)	
-0.022				
(0.019)	
-0.009		
(0.007)	
-0.003		
(0.010)	
-0.026**			
(0.012)	
Cognitive	
reflection	test	
-0.065***	
(0.021)	
-0.052				
(0.033)	
-0.008		
(0.012)	
-0.040**		
(0.016)	
-0.050**	
(0.021)	
Optimism	 -0.002			(0.002)	
-0.001		
(0.003)	
-0.000	
(0.001)	
-0.001	
(0.001)	
-0.001		
(0.002)	
Income	 -0.000			(0.000)	
0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
-0.000	
(0.000)	
Age	 0.001				(0.003)	
-0.003			
(0.004)	
0.001	
(0.001)	
-0.001	
(0.002)	
-0.001	
(0.003)	
Female	 0.009	(0.015)	
0.010			
(0.024)	
0.002		
(0.009)	
0.003	
(0.012)	
0.009		
(0.015)	
Economics	study	 -0.003			(0.019)	
-0.033			
(0.031)	
0.011		
(0.012)	
-0.001	
(0.015)	
-0.015			
(0.019)	
Siblings	 0.007					(0.006)	
0.007	
	(0.010)	
-0.002		
(0.004)	
0.008*	
(0.005)	
0.004		
(0.006)	
Living	expenses	 -0.000			(0.000)	
-0.000			
(0.000)	
-0.000			
(0.000)	
-0.000			
(0.000)	
-0.000			
(0.000)	
Constant	 0.120						(0.078)	
0.321						
(0.124)	
-0.038	
(0.048)	
-0.001	
(0.061)	
0.219						
(0.078)	
	      
Observations	 228	 228	 228	 228	 228	
F-test	 F(10,217)	=	2.89	
F(10,217)	=	
1.24	
F(10,217)	=	
0.42	
F(10,217)	=	
1.17	
F(10,217)	=	
2.54	
Prob	>	F	 0.0021	 0.2675	 0.9376	 0.3132	 0.0066	
R-squared	 0,117	 0,054	 0,019	 0,057	 0,105	
***,**,*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.	
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Secondly,	 we	 perform	 several	 robustness	 checks	 to	 validate	 initial	 findings	 between	
ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 the	 amount	 students	 were	 willing	 to	 borrow.	 These	 initial	 reported	
findings	are	shown	in	Table	C3.	We	controlled	for	production	method	(Table	C4)	of	the	ambiguous	
urn	and	session	effects.		
In	Table	C4	we	reran	our	main	OLS	regression	model	with	three	dummy	variables	relating	
to	the	production	methods	(we	left	the	unknown	production	method	out	as	benchmark).	We	also	
reran	 the	 same	model	by	adding	all	 sessions	as	 separate	dummy	variables	 (unreported).	 The	
results	from	Table	C4	remain	qualitatively	valid.			
However,	when	we	control	for	consistency	in	decision-making	(models	5-6	in	Table	C3)	
and	run	a	Tobit	regression	(Table	C5),	our	results	do	not	hold	anymore.	Please	see	Fig	C6	for	a	
huge	outlier	which	affected	our	initial	findings	reported	in	Table	C3.	
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Table	C3:	Explaining	borrowing	behavior	for	conditional	borrowers	(OLS	estimation)	
Amount	borrowed	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Index	b	 -651.405***																					
(230.864)	
-576.834**																					
(248.701)	
		 -93.108																					
(411.278)	
		
Index	a	 112.304																													
(164.915)	
108.64																													
(170.088)	
		 -88.776																													
(225.407)	
		
AA0.1	 		 		 -30.131						
(402.437)	
75.690						
(420.903)	
		 450.383						
(623.931)	
AA0.5	 		 		 -901.552***						
(287.343)	
-873.240***						
(295.381)	
		 -431.400						
(461.175)	
AA0.9	 		 		 -72.901						
(244.777)	
-14.371						
(258.063)	
		 -15.524					
(327.719)	
Risk	aversion	 		 -92.178																																													
(193.437)	
-134.070																																													
(190.353)	
-149.005																																													
(244.914)	
-164.144 																						
(245.414)	
Financial	literacy	 		 26.995																																																									
(41.188)	
33.399 																																																						
(83.634)	
41.166																																																									
(56.112)	
44.910 																							
(56.2444)	
Cognitive	reflection	
test	
		 47.927																																																									
(85.191)	
33.431 																																																			
(83.634)	
109.054 																														
(109.502)	
85.050																																																						
(112.135)	
Income	 -0.184**																													
(0.089)	
-0.187 																								
(0.093)	
-0.195**																													
(0.087)	
-0.206**																													
(0.091)	
-0.209																													
(0.137)	
-0.217** 																									
(0.137)	
Study	years	 30.205***																																																									
(10.340)	
29.907***																																																									
(10.741)	
32.192*** 																																																					
(10.194)	
32.590*** 																																																						
(10.591)	
23.840 																																																		
(15.793)	
29.175* 																								
(16.678)	
Female	 -24.947																																													
(56.652)	
-10.677																																												
(60.846)	
-58.411																																													
(58.256)	
-45.954																																												
(62.117)	
-27.280																																												
(76.701)	
-50.668 																								
(80.223)	
Economic	study	 235.786**																																			
(89.953)	
226.395**																																			
(94.031)	
227.506**																																			
(88.329)	
215.275**																																			
(92.130)	
236.018*																																			
(139.412)	
245.113* 																							
(139.727)	
Siblings	 45.599**																																					
(20.585)	
45.540**																																					
(22.339)	
45.483**																																					
(20.190)	
43.977**																																					
(21.861)	
3.887 																						
(29.445)	
2.775 																							
(29.469)	
Live	on	own	 183.045**																																
(80.231)	
193.947**																																
(82.583)	
156.483**																																
(79.906)	
164.034**																																
(82.165)	
114.886																																
(126.482)	
91.122																																
(128.727)	
Constant	 224.010																																												
(102.863)	
168.184																																													
(192.215)	
271.896																																											
(103.950)	
242.220																																													
(195.501)	
281.451																																													
(260.794)	
324.803 																					
(264.431)	
Observations	 76	 76	 76	 76	 46	 46	
Consistent	sample	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	
F	test	 F	(8,67)	=	
4.19	
F(11,64)	=	
3.06	
F	(9,66)	=	
4.28	
F(12,63)	=	
3.26	
F(11,34)	=	
1.04	
F(12,33)	
=	1.04	
Prob	>	F	 0.0000	 0.0024	 0.0002	 0.0011	 0.4354	 0.4416	
Adjusted	R-squared	 0.254	 0.232	 0.282	 0.265	 0.0096	 0.0094	
***,**,*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.	 		
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Table	C4:	Robustness	checks	for	production	method	(for	conditional	borrowers)	
Amount	borrowed	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 	
Index	b	 -613.915**																					
(233.867)	
-560.591**																					
(254.354)	
	   
 
Index	a	 100.326						
(164.116)	
95.398																													
(170.500)	
  
 
AA0.1	 	  71.876								
(423.340)	
197.463						
(449.591)	
	
 
AA0.5	 	  -917.825***					
(303.666)	
-915.562***					
(312.127)	
	
 
AA0.9	 	  -37.339					
(249.630)	
23.737					
(266.746)	
	
 
Risk	aversion	 	 -88.363																																				
(195.025)	
-155.937																																					
(192.966)	  
Financial	literacy	 	 16.142																																				
(42.405)	
21.694																																				
(41.427)	  
Cognitive	reflection	test	 	 18.676																																						
(86.785)	
6.709																																						
(84.805)	  
Income	 -0.180**																													
(0.088)	
-0.187**																													
(0.093)	
-0.189**																													
(0.087)	
-0.204**																													
(0.091)	  
Study	years	 29.316***																																																									
(10.400)	
29.825***																																																									
(10.893)	
32.577*** 																																		
(10.322)	
34.288*** 																																		
(10.841)	
	
 
Female	 -16.350																																													
(58.769)	
-11.271																																													
(62.381)	
-43.884 																																		
(59.274)	
-42.353 																																		
(62.680)	  
Economic	study	 230.031**																																			
(92.339)	
227.968**																																			
(96.620)	
229.095** 																																		
(90.416)	
227.383** 																																		
(94.191)	
	
 
Siblings	 45.832**																																					
(20.764)	
44.288**																																					
(22.507)	
48.634** 																																		
(20.383)	
45.039** 																																		
(21.944)	
	
 
Live	on	own	 175.738**																																
(80.483)	
179.904**																																
(83.597)	
140.288*																																
(80.903)	
138.629*																																
(83.953)	
	
 
Human	 -48.204					
(74.433)	
-43.716					
(77.498)	
-99.288					
(77.505)	
-100.250					
(80.441)	
	
 
Compound		 63.635					
(72.164)	
56.123					
(74.685)	
8.859					(76.107)	 -6.741					
(79.021)	
	
 
Nature		 75.287					
(71.303)	
75.137					
(73.500)	
38.243					
(72.389)	
36.555					
(74.090)	
	
 
Constant	 201.406					
(106.168)	
198.881					
(202.591)	
-38.243					
(72.389)	
-95.480					
(67.075)	
	
 
Observations	 76	 76	 76	 76	 	
F	test	 F	(11,64)	=	3.44	 F	(14,61)	=	2.63	 F	(12,63)	=			3.60	 F(15,60)	=				
2.86	
	
Prob	>	F	 0.0008	 0.0048	 0.0004	 0.0020	 	
Adjusted	R-squared	 0.264	 0.233	 0.294	 0.271	 	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.	
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Table	C5:	Determinants	of	the	amount	borrowed	(tobit	estimation	on	the	whole	sample)	
Amount	borrowed	
 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 	
Index	b	 -77.230																					
(399.671)	
-111.847																					
(412.021)	
		 360.405																					
(539.352)	
	
 
Index	a	 80.024																													
(266.513)	
87.697																													
(266.519)	
		 		 -37.476																													
(300.325)	
		 	
 
AA0.1	 		 		 -225.876									
(704.009)	
-323.850									
(706.123)	
		 -387.479								
(826.781)	
	
 
AA0.5	 		 		 16.901										
(537.625)	
52.573											
(540.235)	
		 914.905						
(679.145)	
	
 
AA0.9	 		 		 21.870									
(398.635)	
-15.120												
(410.830)	
		 -70.057					
(464.488)	
	
 
Risk	aversion	 		 -331.274																																													
(318.681)	
-329.767																																													
(319.189)	
-197.933 																											
(348.017)	
-218.331 																										
(348.259)	
	
 
Financial	literacy	 		 -106.101																																																									
(71.246)	
-108.391 																																																							
(71.825)	
-71.780 																										
(80.824)	
-80.812				 																											
(81.211)	
	
 
Cognitive	
reflection	test	
		 -29.084																																																									
(128.532)	
-27.249 																																																							
(128.793)	
-143.465 																												
(150.865)	
-128.924 																								
(150.645)	
	
 
Income	 0.028																													
(0.128)	
0.037																													
(0.128)	
0.028 																											
(0.128)	
0.036																													
(0.128)	
-0.072																													
(0.141)	
-0.217**																											
(0.137)	  
Study	years	 27.167																																																									
(17.703)	
28.225																																																									
(17.576)	
27.162 																											
(17.712)	
28.213 																																																							
(17.592)	
20.416 																											
(21.231)	
17.103 																											
(21.376)	  
Female	 -23.499																																													
(88.599)	
-45.872																																												
(90.540)	
-22.358 																												
(89.009)	
-44.049																																													
(90.897)	
-165.160 																											
(104.788)	
-156.401 																												
(104.444)	
	
 
Economic	study	 -228.236*																																			
(124.048)	
-159.302																																			
(127.675)	
-227.922*																																			
(124.112)	
-157.934																																			
(127.838)	
-295.130* 																												
(157.415)	
-288.963* 																											
(156.849)	
	
 
Siblings	 51.054																																					
(34.885)	
42.521																																				
(35.128)	
50.563 																												
(35.056)	
41.563																																					
(35.325)	
-7.293																																					
(40.522)	
-9.889 																											
(40.533)	  
Live	on	own	 303.805**																																
(119.483)	
301.967**																																
(118.981)	
305.268** 																											
(119.991)	
304.773**																																
(119.594)	
388.097*** 																												
(144.050)	
405.551																																
(145.059)	  
Constant	 -576.797																																												
(165.834)	
-122.016																																													
(281.865)	
-578.419 																										
(166.415)	
-121.561																																												
(282.327)	
-20.731 																											
(315.521)	
-1.645 																											
(316.192)	
	
 
Observations	 228	 228	 228	 228	 136	 136	 	
Consistent	
sample	
0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 	
LR	chi2	 chi2(8)	=	
21.31	
chi2(11)	=	
25.05	
chi2(9)	=	
21.33	
chi2(12)	=	
25.13	
chi2(11)	=	
18.80	
chi2(12)	=	
20.23	
	
Prob	>	chi2	 0.0064	 0.0090	 0.0113	 0.0142	 0.0649	 0.0628	 	
Pseudo	R2	 0.016	 0.019	 0.016	 0.019	 0.0237	 0.0255	 	
***,**,*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.	
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Figure	C6:	Scatter	plot	ambiguity	aversion	and	amount	borrowed	within	sample	of	borrowers	(n=76)	
	
